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ABSTRACT 
A private investigation is an examination of facts, sequence of events, causes for deviance, 
and responsibilities for negative incidents. Recent years have seen an increasing use of private 
internal investigations in terms of the assessment of financial irregularities. The form of 
inquiry aims to uncover vulnerabilities to unrestricted opportunities, failing internal controls, 
abuse of position, and any financial misconduct such as corruption, fraud, embezzlement, 
theft, manipulation, tax evasion and other forms of economic crime. When fraud examiners 
discover evidence of white-collar crime, they almost always leave it to their clients to decide 
whether or not to report crime to the police. We examine the gaps in white-collar crime 
reporting after fraud examination and reasons behind such decisions. In Norway, these gaps 
could be as high as 96% percent, as calculated in this article. Reasons for non-reporting 
include concerns over law enforcement interference with business and consequences of law 
enforcement, lack of trust in the police, and different perceptions of the seriousness of crime. 
We apply the theoretical approach pioneered by Sykes and Matza (1957) and demonstrate 
how techniques of neutralization apply to private fraud examiners’ reasoning for non-
reporting of suspected or detected white-collar crime.  We also offer some possible policy-
based solutions to reduce the identified gaps in reporting.  
 
Keywords: financial crime, white-collar crime, crime reporting, private investigation, crime 
disclosure. 
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Reasons for Gaps in Crime Reporting: The Case of White-Collar 
Criminals Investigated by Private Fraud Examiners in Norway 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Are Blomhoff was a priest and the managing director of the Betanien Foundation in Norway. 
Two whistleblowers told their managers that Blomhoff had embezzled large amounts of 
money. They did not directly inform the chairperson of the board, Christian Hysing-Dahl, 
since it was not clear to the whistleblowers whether he was an ally of Blomhoff. When 
Hysing-Dahl learned about the offense, he was reluctant to report the crime to the police 
(Eikefjord 2015). Instead, he hired fraud examiners from auditing firm BDO (2014a) to 
conduct two private internal investigations. However, when the whistleblowers threatened to 
inform the media, even though they told the chairperson they wanted no police investigation, 
Hysing-Dahl went to the police six months after he had learned about the crime. Drammen 
district court later sentenced Blomhoff to 3 years in prison for embezzlement at the Betanien 
Foundation (Drammen tingrett 2014). 
 The Blomhoff case is not at all the only example of reluctance to report white-collar 
crime to the police. There seems to be quite a gap in crime reporting in the area of white-
collar crime occurring in organizational settings. This article explores the following two sets 
of research questions:  
1) How likely are private fraud examiners to report to the police the evidence of wrongdoing 
they discover in their investigations? What does it tell us about the gaps in reporting? 
2) What are the main reasons for private fraud examiners to avoid reporting the white-collar 
criminals to the police?  
 First, this article explores gaps in crime reporting (Langton et al. 2012), with a specific 
focus on property crimes (Harrell and Langton 2013; Tcherni et al. 2014). Next, we describe 
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in more detail private fraud examinations (ACFE 2014; CFCS 2014; Gottschalk 2014), and 
define and provide some context about white-collar criminals (Schoepfer et al. 2014; 
Sutherland 1949). Then, we describe our theoretical approach that is rooted in the Sykes and 
Matza’s (1957) techniques of neutralization and discuss how it applies to the potential lack of 
reporting of white-collar crime. Finally, a sample of private investigation reports in Norway is 
presented, and based on it, we attempt to answer the two sets of research questions posed 
above. The potential reasons for secrecy and non-disclosure to the police are identified, 
categorized, and discussed in the context of the neutralization techniques theoretical approach. 
Some policy implications and potential solutions are offered to deal with the identified 
problems.  
 
Gaps in Crime Reporting 
Tcherni et al. (2015) argue that there is a glaring gap in crime reporting in relation to the 
growing category of property crime perpetrated online. When fraudulent transactions are 
reported, it is often impossible to infer exactly how the information was obtained, or even 
how it was exploited. Insurance company requirements that victims report losses to the police 
may bias data in favor of higher value losses for those crimes where insurance payments are 
involved (Skogan 1984; Tarling and Morris 2010).  
 Gaps in crime reporting concern the “dark figure of crime” problem, that is, factors 
that cause reported statistics to diverge from and generally underrepresent the true nature and 
extent of crime. The differences between measures of crime reported to (and by) the police 
and actual crime are labelled gaps in crime reporting. For example, the National Crime 
Victimization Survey (NCVS) conducted annually in the United States on a large, 
representative sample of general population allows us to make several observations about 
gaps in crime reporting: 
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1) The type of crime that is reported to the police most reliably is motor vehicle theft – 
83% of it was reported to the police in 2006-2010 (Langton et al. 2012:4). 
2) The largest gaps in reporting – i.e., the smallest proportion of victims reporting their 
victimization to the police – exist for rape/sexual assault (35% was reported) and 
household property theft (33% was reported), according to NCVS data for 2006-2010 
(Langton et al. 2012:4). 
3) The main reasons for not reporting property victimization (theft, burglary, larceny, 
etc.) to the police are: “Police would not or could not help” (around 36% of those who 
did not report), and “Not important enough to victim to report” (another 30% of non-
reporters), as documented by Langton and her colleagues (2012:4). 
4) If we focus on the identity theft portion of the National Crime Victimization Survey, 
fewer than 10% of victims sampled by the NCVS in 2012 reported their victimization 
to law enforcement agencies (Harrell and Langton 2013:24). Tcherni et al. (2015) 
suggest that real gaps in reporting may be even wider, considering that not all victims 
of identity theft realize they have been victimized. 
Moreover, since a sizable portion of property crime is perpetrated online, there are additional 
problems with underreporting of these crimes, besides the possible lack of awareness about 
victimization: online property crimes are often perpetrated against organizations, and thus it is 
very difficult to estimate their scope and reporting in the absence of concerted data collection 
(Tcherni et al. 2015).   
 In this article, we examine in more detail a specific type of property crime – white-
collar crime – and discuss the reasons for its non-reporting. This type of property crime, just 
like online property crime, is often perpetrated against organizations, and thus it cannot be 
captured in victimization surveys of individuals. Unlike online property crime, white-collar 
crime is typically disguised as part of conducting legal business operations by an employee or 
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business owner where the victim might be one’s own organization, another organization, or 
governmental agency.  
 There are certain parallels and contrasts that can be drawn between white-collar, 
online property crime, and street property crime, especially when comparing (non-)reporting 
patterns, reasons for non-reporting, and theoretical considerations related to crime reporting. 
We will explore in detail the main reasons why white-collar crime is not reported to the 
police.  
 In fact, the decision about reporting often rests with the professionals who detect or 
suspect white-collar crime first – private fraud examiners hired by companies in need of 
audits – and thus it is important to clarify the role of these examiners. 
 
Private Fraud Examiners 
Internal private investigations examine facts, sequence of events, and the causes of negative 
events as well as who are responsible for such events. Depending on what hiring parties ask 
for, private investigators can either look generally for corrupt or otherwise criminal activities 
within an agency or company, or look more specifically for those committing white-collar 
crime. In other situations, it is the job of the private investigators to look into potential 
opportunities for financial crime to occur, so that the agency or company can solve those 
problems in order to avoid misconduct down the road (Gottschalk 2014). 
 Internal investigations include fact-finding, causality study, change proposals, and 
suspect identification. Recent years have seen an increasing use of private internal 
investigations in terms of the assessment of financial irregularities. The form of inquiry aims 
to uncover unrestricted opportunities, failing internal controls, abuse of position, and any 
financial misconduct such as corruption, fraud, embezzlement, theft, manipulation, tax 
evasion, and other forms of economic crime (ACFE 2014; CFCS 2014). 
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 Characteristics that can be attributed to a private investigation include a serious and 
unusual event, an extraordinary examination to find out what happened or why it did not 
happen, develop explanations, and suggest actions towards individuals and changes in 
systems and practices. A private investigator is someone who is hired by individuals or 
organizations to undertake investigatory law services. They often work for attorneys in civil 
cases. A private investigator can also be called a private eye, private detective, inquiry agent, 
fraud examiners, private examiners, financial crime specialist, or PI for short. A private 
investigator does the dirty work to find the answers to who committed the crime. Financial 
crime has become a major offense that private investigators are hired to find the solutions to 
in order to bring justice to the individuals affected. 
 Criminal investigation is a goal-oriented procedure for reconstructing the past. It is a 
method of creating an account of what has happened, how it happened, why it happened, and 
who did what to make it happen or let it happen. Criminal investigation is a reconstruction of 
past events and sequence of events by collecting information and evidence. An investigation 
is designed to answer questions such as when, where, what, how, who, and why, as such 
questions relate to negative events in the past. Investigations take many forms and have many 
purposes. Carson (2013) argues that the core feature of every investigation involves what we 
reliably know. The field of evidence is no other than the field of knowledge.  
 White-collar crime investigations are a specialized knowledge industry. Williams 
(2005) refers to it as the forensic accounting and criminal investigation industry. It is a unique 
industry, set apart from law enforcement, due to its ability to provide “direct and immediate 
responsiveness to client objectives, needs and interests” (Williams 2005:194). Unlike police 
“who are bound to one specific legal regime” (Williams 2005:194), the industry provides 
flexibility and a customized plan of attack according to client needs. 
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 Private fraud examiners complete their work by providing clients with reports of 
investigations. Examples in the United States include the Powers et al. (2002) report on the 
Enron collapse, the Sidley (2010) report on corruption in procurement, the Valukas (2010) 
report on the Lehman Brothers collapse, the Valukas (2014) report on the General Motors 
ignition switch recalls, the Wilmer and PwC (2003) report on WorldCom accounting fraud, 
and the WilmerHale and PwC (2008) report on Walters embezzlement. 
 
White-Collar Criminals 
A white-collar criminal is typically a member of the privileged socioeconomic classes in 
society (Sutherland 1949) who is involved in illegal activities and commits nonviolent acts for 
financial gain (Gottschalk 2012). The white-collar criminal is a person of respectability who 
commits crime in a professional setting, where criminal activities are concealed and disguised 
in organizational work (Pontell et al. 2014). The criminal has power and influence, he forms 
relationships with other persons or professionals, which protects him from developing a 
criminal identity, and he enjoys trust from others in privileged networks. White-collar crime 
refers to offenses committed in an organization by those who indulge in dishonest activities, 
either by themselves or using agents, for financial gain (Schoepfer et al. 2014).  
 One out of many explanations provided for white-collar crime is the fear of falling in 
terms of a fear of losing what one has worked so hard to obtain (Piquero 2012). Given an 
opportunity to commit white-collar crime, certain personality characteristics such as low self-
control increase the likelihood of committing an offense (Piquero et al. 2008). 
 Law enforcement targeted at white-collar criminals is non-aggressive and often 
discrete not only because of the upper-class affiliation. Another reason is white-collar 
defendants’ ability to recruit top defense lawyers who apply symbolic defense in addition to 
substance defense, as well as information control, in their work for white-collar clients 
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(Gottschalk 2014). It is well known that having a well-qualified and possibly famous attorney 
increases one’s chances of a favorable outcome in any legal dispute. Some individual white-
collar offenders avoid criminal prosecution because of the class bias of the courts (Tombs and 
Whyte 2003).  According to Pontell et al. (2014), some white-collar offenders may simply be 
too powerful to go to jail. 
 When white-collar criminals appear before their sentencing judges, they can correctly 
claim to be first-time offenders (Benson and Simpson 2015). According to Slyke and Bales 
(2013), theory and empirical research often have agreed that white-collar offenders benefit 
from leniency at the sentencing stage of criminal justice system processing. Croall (2007) 
argues that the term “crime” is contentious, as many of the harmful activities of businesses or 
occupational elites are not subject to criminal law and punishment but administrative or 
regulatory law and penalties and sanctions. Therefore, very few white-collar criminals seem 
to be put on trial, and even fewer higher-class criminals are sentenced to imprisonment. 
 Another reason for the low prosecution and conviction rate for white-collar criminals 
is the extraordinarily broadly and fuzzily defined offenses in criminal law for white-collar 
crime (Hasnas et al. 2010). In addition, it is often difficult to prove the intent (mens rea) 
required for criminal conviction (Podgor 2007; Green 2014). Many (especially those in the 
corporate world) view white-collar crime simply as risky business (Benson 1985; Will et al. 
1998, Benson and Simpson 2015). Hence, there is a reluctance to charge top-level criminals, 
as was evident in the aftermath of the 2008 economic meltdown in the United States (Pontell 
and Geis 2013). 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Criminals apply techniques in order to make them feel as though they have done nothing 
wrong. These techniques are called neutralization techniques, whereby the feeling of guilt is 
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neutralized. Neutralization theory, in its original formulation, was proposed by Sykes and 
Matza (1957) to explain how juvenile delinquents’ desire to conform coexists with their 
deviance. Sykes and Matza proposed five techniques of neutralization: 
1. Denial of responsibility. The offender here claims that one or more of the conditions 
of responsible agency were not met. The person committing a deviant act defines 
himself or herself as lacking responsibility for his or her actions. In this technique, the 
person rationalizes that the action in question is beyond his or her control. The 
offender views themself as a billiard ball, helplessly propelled through different 
situations. 
2. Denial of injury. The offender seeks to minimize or deny the harm done. Denial of 
injury involves justifying an action by minimizing the harm it causes. The misbehavior 
is not really serious because no party suffers directly as a result of it. 
3. Denial of victim. The offender acknowledges the injury, but claims that the victim is 
unworthy of concern. Any blame for illegal actions is unjustified because the violated 
party deserves whatever injury they receive. 
4. Condemnation of the condemners. The offender tries to accuse his or her critics of 
questionable motives for criticizing him. According to this technique, one neutralizes 
his or her actions by blaming those who are the target of the action. For example, the 
white-collar offender deflects moral condemnation onto those ridiculing corporations 
by pointing out that they engage in similar disapproved behavior. 
5. Appeal to higher loyalties. The offender denies the act was motivated by self-interest, 
claiming that it was instead done out of obedience to some moral obligation. This 
technique is employed by those who feel they are in a dilemma that must be resolved 
at the cost of violating a law or policy. In the context of an organization, an employee 
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may appeal to organizational values or hierarchies. For example, an employee could 
argue that he or she has to violate a policy in order to get his or her work done. 
Personal neutralization of misconduct and crime is not limited to white-collar criminals. 
However, it seems that these techniques are applied by such criminals to a great extent 
(Benson 1985; Piquero et al. 2005; Gottschalk and Smith 2011; Benson and Simpson 2015).  
 However, in this paper, we argue that the same techniques of neutralization also apply 
to the reasoning of private fraud examiners when they make decisions as to whether they 
should report the suspected crime to the police.  Their desire to conform to the rules makes 
them shift the responsibility for reporting possible illegal behavior to others – most likely, to 
the client who ordered the investigation.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
To find answers to our two research questions – How often are white-collar criminals 
investigated by private fraud examiners not reported to the police and why – we applied an 
approach of asking for private investigation reports.  To ask for a report, we needed to know 
that there was one. Our sources of detection of reports included media stories, rumors, and 
personal contacts. During the year of 2014, we were able to access a total of 35 fraud 
examination reports in Norway, as listed in Table 1.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 Our sample was obtained through non-probability purposive sampling and thus cannot 
confidently be said to represent all private investigations in a given country (Norway). At the 
same time, the method of obtaining the reports included enough versatility in identifying the 
private investigation cases where reports were written, and seeking out these reports. Thus, 
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our sample can serve as a tentative way to get an approximate idea of the variety of white-
collar crimes being first detected or suspected by private examiners. 
 Norway is similar to other developed countries in Europe and North America in terms 
of its business practices. Norway is a small country of five million inhabitants. In terms of its 
size, climate, standard of living and demographics, Norway might best be compared to the 
state of Connecticut in the United States. Therefore, this sample might be cautiously taken to 
be representative of white-collar investigations in general in the Western world. 
 The second column in Table 1 lists the client organization where the fraud 
examination was conducted, while the third column lists the firm conducting the 
investigation. The fourth column describes white-collar crime suspicion that was to be 
investigated by fraud examiners. Column five lists the number of pages in the internal 
investigation report. Some of these reports are summary reports. For example, the ten-page 
report from BDO (2014a) is a summary report, while the complete report has 150 pages. The 
chairperson of the board, Christian Hysing-Dahl, was never willing to disclose the complete 
report to us. 
 The two final columns in Table 1 are of particular interest to our research. Whether the 
case was reported to the police is indicated with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. Most cases were not reported 
to the police, because investigators did not find sufficient evidence to claim that criminal 
offense had occurred. 11 out of 35 cases were reported to the police (31%). If the case was 
reported to the police, it might end up in conviction (Yes) or dismissal (No).  In our sample, 7 
out of 11 reported cases resulted in conviction, indicating that 64 percent of all cases reported 
to the police ended up in prison sentences for white-collar criminals. 
 Table 1 lists all reports that we were able to detect and obtain as researchers in 
Norway during the year 2014. A number of additional investigation reports were detected, but 
they were not disclosed to us. We were denied access to reports at Din Baker bakery chain 
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investigated by PwC, Finance Credit money collection firm investigated by Ernst & Young, 
Spitsbergen mining company investigated by PwC, Norwegian Parliament pension fund 
investigated by a university professor, Nopec oil exploration company investigated by a law 
firm, Veidekke construction company investigated by Ernst & Young, Yara fertilizer producer 
investigated by law firm Wiersholm, ISS cleaning services investigated by PwC, and several 
others investigated by fraud examiners. Some client companies did not respond to our 
requests at all. Others provided reasons for denying the reports. Approximately 20 detected 
private investigation reports were not disclosed to us.  
 We can assume that these 20 reports were neither disclosed to us nor to the police.  
More importantly, the number of investigation reports never detected by us is much larger. 
We can assume that about 100 knowledge workers in law firms, auditing firms and other 
professional service firms in Norway work full-time on private internal investigations. If three 
investigations are completed per person per year, then there are an estimated 300 reports 
produced each year. When comparing our detected 55 reports to the estimated total of 300 
reports, we get a fraction of only 18 percent that become known to us, and 12 percent (35 
reports) ending up in the public domain.  
 We have no reason to assume that the suspected crimes investigated in the reports 
disclosed to us are any more serious than the possible crimes investigated in the reports kept 
from us. It is often the case that, as in the opening example to this article, crime only gets 
reported to the police if whistleblowers come forward threatening to make their information 
public. Their personal courage is likely a better indicator of reporting to the police than the 
severity of misdeeds the whistleblowers want to disclose.  
 Investigators argue that reports are the property of their clients, while clients argue that 
there are circumstances that prevent them from disclosing reports. In our search for private 
investigation reports, we met a variety of reasons why we were denied access to investigation 
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reports. The reasons for secrecy fall into three main categories. First, there were reasons 
important to the company being investigated. Second, there were reasons important to the 
investigating firm. Finally, there were reasons important for the relationship between the 
investigated and the investigator. These reasons for the denial of report disclosure are listed in 
Table 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
RESEARCH RESULTS 
In our sample of 35 detected and accessed fraud examination reports, 11 cases (31%) were 
reported to the police. However, this figure cannot be taken to represent the true gaps in crime 
reporting since the main reason we have these 11 cases in our sample is because they were 
reported to the police. We have estimated that about 300 private investigation reports are 
produced annually by fraud examiners in Norway. This number can serve as a conservative 
estimate of white-collar crime cases since an unknown but probably a non-trivial number of 
white-collar crimes like corporate fraud is not detected (Dyck et al. 2013; Zakolyukina 2014). 
 Thus, even assuming that some of these 300 reports are based on unfounded 
suspicions, it is more likely that they still considerably underrepresent white-collar crimes 
actually committed. However, let’s go with this lower, conservative estimate of just 300 cases 
of suspected corporate fraud. If only 11 of them were reported, it means that 3.7% of all 
detected corporate crimes were reported to the police.  
 We can take an alternative approach to estimating a true amount of corporate fraud. 
Based on a clever use of a natural experiment (the fall of Arthur Andersen audit firm), 
Alexander Dyck and his colleagues (2013) were able to estimate the incidence of corporate 
fraud by comparing the rate of fraud detection by the new auditor compared to that detected 
by Arthur Andersen, and they concluded that corporate fraud is likely to be committed by 
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14.5% of businesses. There are about 416,000 businesses in Norway, according to the 
Norwegian Register of Business Enterprises (Brønnøysund Register Centre (BRC) N.d.). The 
Dyck et al.’s (2013) incidence estimate would imply that over 60,320 of businesses in 
Norway are likely to engage in some type of fraudulent business activities. 300 seems like an 
impossibly low figure compared to the 60,320 estimate. If we go with this upper estimate of 
60,320 possible fraud, only about .5% of these (300) are investigated by private fraud 
examiners, and, as we stated above, less than 4% of these suspected crimes investigated by 
fraud examiners are reported to the police. Clearly, our calculations support the initial 
assumption in our paper that the gap in crime reporting for white-collar criminals is 
substantial – over 96%. 
 Further, as we see from Table 1, 7 of the 11 reported cases (or 64% of cases reported 
to the police), ended in convictions of white-collar criminals in court. These are the only cases 
of corporate fraud brought to conviction in Norway. Thus, only about 2% of white-collar 
criminals identified/suspected annually in private investigations (7 out of the assumed 300) 
are brought to justice. And if we accept the possibility that over 60,320 businesses are 
involved in some sort of corporate fraud, 7 cases represent the rate of criminal prosecution 
and punishment of about  .01%, or 1/100th of 1% of possible criminal activity.  
 
 To find answers to our second research question – Why are white-collar criminals 
investigated by private fraud examiners not reported to the police? – we base our findings on 
the analysis of our experience from detecting and asking for investigation reports in 2014. 
 Before we describe the main categories of reasons that private examiners do not report 
the detected or suspected white-collar crime to the police, we have to point out the key factor 
that determines the way private examiners see their responsibilities and options available to 
them. This key factor has to do with control. By hiring examiners from an auditing firm or 
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law firm, the client organization pays for the investigation and is owner of the investigation 
report. Thus, the client has complete control over information flows to and from the 
investigation. As a result, the reasoning of private fraud examiners and the companies they 
investigate lines up for the next three groups of reasons for non-reporting.  
 
First, there is a group of reasons concerned with business and enterprise management and 
maintaining control over the situation, where the company would like to avoid interference 
with business: 
1. Reputation. If it becomes known that the police are investigating the case, it could lead 
to negative publicity and financial loss, in line with disclosure as described above. For 
example, law-abiding employees who are attractive on the labor market could choose 
to leave. Qualified external candidates could choose not to apply.  
2. Exclusion. As long as the company is under investigation by the police, the company 
may be put on hold for contracts in both the public and private sectors. Customers will 
generally be more reserved towards the company. The same can happen with suppliers 
because they are uncertain about the outcome of a police investigation.  
3. Effort. Crime is not reported because it takes too much time and effort. The police will 
ask for all kinds of documentation and access to computers. If the police opens an 
investigation, then key employees will have to spend time in police interviews, and 
executives will have to spend time explaining to police officers how the organization 
operates. Instead of spending time with and for the police, the business prefers to 
spend time with customers and developing new products. 
Next, there is a group of reasons concerned with consequences of law enforcement (LE): 
4. LE Penalty. Reaction against the company may be a reason for not going to the police. 
The company hopes it can keep the matter hidden and thus not losing money as they 
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would have to pay a potential fine. Generally, the consequences of going to the police 
are considered greater than keeping the matter hidden. 
5. Protection from LE. Shielding both individuals and the organization from police 
investigation is yet another reason for not disclosing evidence of white-collar crime to 
the police. In a police investigation, people other than those who were subject to 
negative attention might emerge in a bad light and possibly end up being indicted, 
prosecuted, and convicted.  
6. Bargaining with LE. Plea bargaining is available to a varying degree in different 
countries. Where this option is limited or nonexistent, people will be even less 
reluctant to report suspicions of white-collar crime to the police fearing the severe 
consequences of prosecution. (A plea bargain is an agreement in a criminal case 
between the prosecutor and the defendant whereby the defendant agrees to plead 
guilty to a particular charge in return for some concession from the prosecutor, usually 
a reduction in charges and/or more leniency in sentencing.) 
Third, there is a group of reasons concerned with lack of trust in the police: 
7. Police Passivity. Police often demonstrate passivity when approached about possible 
offenses. Many cases are dismissed without investigation. A survey by Norway 
Security Council (2014) shows that 75 % of companies that responded to the survey 
agreed with the statement that crime is not reported because the police usually dismiss 
the case without proper investigation. However, notice that in our current study, 64% 
of cases referred to the police resulted in convictions. Thus, this reason might have 
more to do with perception than reality. 
8. Police Competence. Investigating white-collar crime suspicions requires highly 
specialized expertise, which is often not available in the police at the time a potential 
financial crime is reported to law enforcement. For years, forensic accountants from 
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the private sector have been used by government agencies in crime investigations and 
prosecutions. 
9. Police Capacity. There is an inability of the state to unilaterally cope with the rising 
tide of economic crime due to limited resources. Police officers with training in 
financial crime investigations are hired by professional services firms where they can 
double or triple their salary as financial crime specialists. 
10. Police Failure. Just like a private investigation can fail to establish the facts, so can 
police investigations fail to find the truth about a negative incident. If police 
investigations are expected to end up in nothing, why bother involve the police, some 
organizations may certainly argue. Again, this perception might not reflect the reality 
correctly, since in about two thirds of the cases reported to the police in our sample, 
the perpetrators were brought to justice. Alternatively, it can be that these were the 
cases with the strongest evidence of wrongdoing and thus they do not represent the 
other cases that were not brought to police attention. 
Notice that, as we stated in the Gaps in Crime Reporting section above, the main reason for 
individuals to not report their property victimization to law enforcement is very similar to the 
above-described reasons: “Police would not or could not help”.  
  
Finally, there is a reason for non-reporting that is concerned with a “grey-area” judgment of 
whether the situation actually constitutes a crime. Moreover, this is one reason that is likely to 
apply both to the client organizations being investigated and to the private investigators, 
independently from their duties to their clients: 
11. Trifle, or “grey area”. What happened is considered to be an insignificant issue. 
White-collar offenders operate with relative impunity because of widespread 
apathy in both private and public contexts. The organization has tolerance and 
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leniency towards internal criminals in trusted positions. For both insiders and 
outsiders, it is not quite clear where the line can be drawn separating aggressive 
or inventive business practices from illegal activities.  
 
Applying Sykes and Matza’s techniques of neutralization, we can classify the first group of 
reasons for the failure of private investigators and their clients to report their findings to law 
enforcement (Reasons 1 through 3, related to interference with business) as falling into the 
category of “denial of responsibility”: the client owns the report and thus they have the duty 
to decide what to do with it, especially since it is their organization that will bear the brunt of 
burden related to a possible police investigation. The responsibility of a business is to make a 
profit in the market place. It is not the responsibility of a business enterprise to practice or 
contribute to law enforcement in society. There is nothing in it for an organization to see a 
former executive receive a conviction for white-collar crime in court and sentenced to prison. 
 The second group of reasons (Reasons 4 through 6, related to the consequences of law 
enforcement) seems to reflect the “appeal to higher loyalties”: the loyalty of private fraud 
examiners to the client is higher than their loyalty to enforcing laws. Similarly, the loyalty of 
the client to organizational goals and strategies is higher than their loyalty to enforcing laws. 
 The third group of reasons (Reasons 7 through 10, related to distrust of police) is a 
variation on Sykes and Matza’s “condemnation of the condemners”: police are likely 
incompetent, overburdened and slow-to-react, and would not be able to do much so why even 
bother turning to them. The police are not in a position to condemn business enterprises and 
other organizations, as well as private investigators, for not disclosing crime reports to them, 
as the police are often reluctant and incompetent to investigate. Private investigators thus 
condemn the police as “condemners”. 
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 Finally, the last reason (Reason 11, concerning the lack of clarity on whether the 
uncovered evidence points to an illegal activity), falls into the categories of “denial of 
injury” or “denial of the victim”: private examiners may interpret the wrongdoing as just a 
way of doing business that did not hurt anybody or that is done by other companies as well, 
even if these other companies could have been the potential victims. In many cases, the client 
organization is in itself the victim, and jailing offenders does not help recovering the loss. 
Rather, a private and secret settlement with the offender can be more profitable to the former 
employer. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Many fraud examiners consider their reports as the sole property of their clients, since clients 
pay for the job and for the result in the shape of investigation reports. They consider their 
work as a piece of consulting assignment or legal advice, which might be protected by the 
client-attorney privilege (Schechtman 2014). 
 As a key issue in private investigations, disclosure is required to ensure criminal 
justice is served by avoiding privatization of law enforcement or prosecution and conclusion 
(for example, fired from the job and convicted to pay back of money). Therefore, all reasons 
for secrecy are indeed questionable in cases of obvious crime suspicions. To avoid the 
discomfort of concealing crime from law enforcement, the private fraud examiners are likely 
using the techniques of neutralization: denial of responsibility (for the reasons for secrecy 
including reputation, exclusion, and effort), appeal to higher loyalties (protecting the client 
from LE penalty and damage), condemnation of the condemners (police passivity, 
questionable competence and capacity, and perceived police failure), and denial of injury or 
denial of the victim (when the situation is interpreted as trifle or “grey area” rather than 
criminal activity).   
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  Several of these reasons fall into the same two main categories that are primarily listed 
by property crime victims for not reporting the crime to the police: “Police would not or could 
not help” (lack of trust in the police), and “[The situation is] not important enough to report”. 
Another group of reasons – concern for consequences of law enforcement – closely resembles 
a distant third reason nominated by individuals in the NCVS for non-reporting to the police: 
“Fear of reprisal or getting offender in trouble”. And finally, what seems to be the key group 
of reasons concerns business and enterprise management – interference with business – and is 
uniquely connected with corporate considerations. 
 Secrecy to the police is a far greater question in society than cost-benefit for the 
company involved. Private investigations are of concern because they involve a privatization 
of police investigations of potential punishable acts. 
 While some private investigations come up with trivial findings as perceived by the 
client, it happens that the business firmly believes there has been a crime and goes to the 
police with their findings. But then the police may dismiss the case, which evokes very 
negative reactions from the ones who reported the offense. Four such cases are listed in Table 
1. 
 More frequently, however, the opposite seems to occur: the client does not think it is 
serious enough to go to the police. When the police learn about the case, then it turns out to be 
serious enough. Seven out of eleven (64%) cases led to prison sentences.  
 When the police in Norway learned about a communication company having bribed 
officials in Romania to get a contract, it turned out that PricewaterhouseCoopers had already 
investigated the matter and found misconduct. But top management at the communication 
company Kongsberg Group had decided not to disclose the investigation report (Hovland 
2014). 
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 Williams (2005) suggests the introduction of more rigorous protocols for the transfer 
of cases between the public and private sectors, as well as the enactment of clearer guidelines 
for working relationships between industry practitioners and the police.  
 We suggest that there are two ways to counteract the techniques of neutralization and 
induce the private investigators to report the crimes they have potentially uncovered to the 
police: “carrots” and “sticks”. “Carrots” could be some financial or other incentives to 
provide for private investigators reporting the crime: for example, a portion of recovered 
monetary value can be paid to the private investigator and his/her audit company (sort of a 
finder’s fee). “Sticks” could be stiff financial penalties for not disclosing the suspected white-
collar crime to the law enforcement authorities. Alternatively, there can be legal mandates put 
in place to require reporting of detected or suspected white-collar fraud, similar to the 
mandatory corporate sustainability reporting instituted in many countries throughout the 
world and turning out to be beneficial rather than damaging to business (see Ioannou and 
Serafeim 2014).    
 
CONCLUSION 
The gaps in white-collar crime reporting after fraud examinations in Norway might be as high 
as over 96 percent, as calculated in this article. Reasons for these gaps can be found in 
avoidance of law enforcement interference with business, fear of consequences of law 
enforcement, lack of trust in the police, and different perceptions of the seriousness of crime. 
 Based on Sykes and Matza’s theoretical approach, we argue that private fraud 
examiners are likely to use the techniques of neutralization to support their decisions about 
not reporting the crime to the police. They see their client – the organization where crime has 
occurred – as the party responsible for the type of decisions related to notifying law 
enforcement authorities. 
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 The rule of law and criminal justice is secured in constitutional states by public 
prosecution and courts that are open to everyone to observe. If there are suspicions of 
violations of criminal laws in a country, it is important that information about suspects 
become known to public authorities such as police investigators and public prosecutors. Thus, 
we offer some potential solutions to remedy the situation. Concerted legislative efforts can 
create positive (“carrots”) or negative (“sticks”) incentives for private fraud examiners and 
their audit companies to report suspected white-collar crime.  Disclosure of investigation 
reports is a must in cases of criminal offences. Preferably, investigation reports should not 
only be disclosed to the police but also to citizens through the media and to researchers such 
as ourselves. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of reports from financial crime specialists in private investigations in 
Norway 
# Case Investigator Suspicion Pages Police Prison 
1 Adecco 
Nursing and cleaning 
services business 
Wiersholm (2011) 
law firm 
Exploitation of work 
force in nursing home in 
terms of low wages and 
inhuman working hours 
22 
 
No - 
2 Andebu kommune 
Municipality 
BDO (2014c) Disqualification of 
mayor in real estate 
transactions 
23 No - 
3 Ahus 
Public hospital 
PwC (2013a) 
auditing firm 
Buying expensive 
geographical 
information system 
services 
15 No - 
4 Betanien 
Methodist Church 
Foundation 
BDO (2014a) 
auditing firm 
Embezzlement by chief 
executive officer 
10 
 
Yes Yes 
5 Briskeby 
Football stadium 
Lynx (2011) law 
firm 
Over charging for 
construction work at 
football stadium 
267 No - 
6 Eckbo 
Family foundation 
Dobrowen and 
Klepp (2009) law 
firm 
Executives in ideal 
foundation for personal 
gain 
119 No - 
7 Fadderbarna 
NGO for children 
BDO (2011) 
auditing firm 
Excessive 
administration costs in 
NGO 
46 No - 
8 Forsvaret 
Army 
Dalseide (2006) 
public 
investigator 
Suspected corruption at 
procurement of 
information technology 
184 No - 
9 Furuheim 
Church foundation 
Dalane and Olsen 
(2006) law firm 
Executives in church 
foundation for personal 
gain 
164 Yes Yes 
10 Gassnova 
Carbon capture and 
storage 
BDO (2013a) 
auditing firm 
Irregular procurement 
procedures by 
employees 
27 No - 
11 Hadeland og 
Ringerike Bredbånd 
Broadband 
communication 
company 
Hadeland Energi 
Utility company 
PwC (2014a, 
2014b) 
 
Embezzlement by chief 
financial officer 
32 
25 
Yes Yes 
12 Halden ishall 
Sports ice arena 
KPMG (2012) 
auditing firm 
Excessive cost overrun 
in reconstruction 
121 No - 
13 Halden kommune 
Municipality 
Gjørv and Lund 
(2013) 
Manager in department 
of planning and 
construction suspected 
of corruption 
46 No - 
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14 Kraft & Kultur 
Power utility 
company 
Ernst & Young 
(2012) 
Chief executive officer 
manipulated financial 
results 
31 Yes Yes 
15 Kragerø 
Fjordbåtselskap 
Shipping company 
Deloitte (2012) Chief executive 
suspected of abuse of 
company funds 
109 No - 
16 Langemyhr 
Construction 
company 
PwC (2008a) 
auditing firm 
Fraud by overbilling 
city work in hours 
26 Yes No 
17 Lindeberg 
Nursing home 
Kommune-
revisjonen (2013) 
auditing service 
Outside authority of 
personnel 
92 No - 
18 Lundegruppen 
Transportation 
company 
Bie (2012) law 
firm 
Fraud and tax evasion 
for 30 million US 
dollars 
86 Yes Yes 
19 Moskvaskolen 
Norwegian school in 
Moscow 
Ernst & Young 
(2013a, 2013b) 
auditing firm 
Private living expenses 
for dean covered by 
school 
52 
23 
Yes No 
20 Norges 
Fotballforbund 
Football association 
Lynx (2013) law 
firm 
Football players 
changing clubs without 
clubs paying transfer 
money 
48 No - 
21 Norges Idrettsforbund 
Sports Association 
BDO (2014b) Chairperson suspected 
of involvement in 
corruption 
4 No - 
22 Omsorgsbygg 
City of Oslo nursing 
home project in Spain 
PwC (2009) 
auditing firm 
Abuse of public money 
spent on friends in Spain 
to build a local hospital 
for Norwegians 
92 No - 
23 Norsk Tipping 
Public betting firm 
Deloitte (2010) 
auditing firm 
Financial relationships 
between employees and 
external firm 
61 No - 
24 Oslo Vei 
Road construction 
company 
Kvale (2013) law 
firm 
Chairman and CEO 
suspected of fraud after 
bankruptcy  
53 Yes No 
25 Romerike Vannverk 
Public water supply 
Distrikts-
revisjonen (2007) 
Chief executive 
suspected of corruption 
and embezzlement 
555 Yes Yes 
26 Samferdselsetaten 
Public transportation 
PwC (2007) Suspicion of kickbacks 
from taxi owners for 
licenses 
88 No - 
27 Stangeskovene 
Private forest 
property 
Roscher and Berg 
(2013) 
Board members 
controlling share sales 
94 No - 
28 Stavanger kommune 
City of Stavanger 
project for Turkish 
children 
PwC (2013b) 
auditing firm 
Smuggling of adopted 
children out of Turkey 
financed by the city of 
Stavanger 
14 Yes No 
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29 Sykehuset Innlandet 
Hospital 
Davidsen and 
Sandvik (2011) 
Chief executive 
suspected of 
employment violations 
15 No - 
30 Terra 
Cities investing in 
bonds 
PwC (2008b) 
auditing firm 
Outside authority of city 
management 
52 No - 
31 Troms Kraft 
Power supply 
company 
Nergaard (2013) 
consulting firm 
Accounting 
manipulation in 
subsidiary and illegal 
political party support 
663 No - 
32 Undervisningsbygg 
School maintenance 
agency 
Kommune-
revisjonen 
(2006a, 2006b) 
auditing service 
Fraud by property 
managers in the City of 
Oslo 
36 Yes Yes 
33 Verdibanken 
Religious bank 
Wiersholm (2012) 
law firm 
Investment fraud by 
bank executive 
5 No - 
34 Videoforhandlere 
Video film 
distributors and 
dealers 
BDO (2013b) 
auditing firm 
Subsidies paid to video 
publishers 
20 No - 
35 World Ventures 
Lottery company 
Lotteritilsynet 
(2014) gaming 
authority 
Ponzi scheme in betting 
firm 
17 No - 
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Table 2. Reasons for denial of disclosure of private investigation reports to the public 
Reasons important for the 
investigated company 
 
Reasons important for the 
investigating firm 
Reasons important for the 
investigator-client relationship 
Damage. The private 
investigation report includes 
business secrets that might be 
damaging to disclose to 
competitors. 
Confidentiality. Lawyers and 
other investigators require 
respect of the client-attorney 
privilege similar to medical 
doctors and psychologists. 
 
Suspicion. The investigation 
report describes suspicion 
towards individuals, which the 
client neither chose to follow up 
nor report to the police. 
Disagreement. Executives in the 
client organization disagree how 
to interpret the investigation 
report. 
 
Error. Serious flaws, mistakes, 
errors and shortcomings can be 
found in the investigation 
report, which investigators do 
not want others to find out and 
learn about. 
 
Packaging. The investigation 
report is impossible to read 
because of lack of clarity in its 
presentation. 
 
Protection. Many key 
individuals in the organization 
have provided sensitive 
information to the investigators. 
They need protection.  
Accusation. A number of 
unfounded accusations against 
individual persons can be 
present in the investigation 
report. 
 
Termination. The internal 
investigation was never 
completed. 
 
Workload. Before possible 
disclosure, a number of words 
need to be blacked out, which 
represents too much work. 
 
Failure. Investigators were 
unable to answer the questions 
formulated by the client in the 
mandate, and the investigation 
was thus a failure. 
Evidence. Findings from a 
private investigation can lose its 
value as evidence in a following 
police investigation and 
prosecution in the criminal 
justice system, if disclosed to 
the public. 
Discretion. Top executives who 
initiated the investigation do not 
like to see information about 
themselves being disclosed. 
 
Misconduct. Investigators 
ignored or violated protection 
against self-incrimination and 
other ethical guidelines for 
professional examinations. 
 
Sensitivity. Both client and 
investigator are afraid of 
breaking privacy law because of 
sensitive personal information 
in the report. 
Property. The client has paid 
investigators for the report and 
feels no obligation to disclose it 
to others. 
Criticism. Investigators do not 
like the report to be exposed to 
criticism by researchers and 
others. 
 
 
 
 
 
